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Welcome to this issue of Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review. This issue contains 5 
articles covering the wine industry, microfinance institutions, cooperative banking and board 
disclosure and independence, and organizational citizenship and reputation.  
  
The first article, by Bruno Marsigalia, Renato Giovannini, Emanuela Palumbo looks at family 
businesses and the Italian wine industry. Family businesses are the most common form of 
financial organizing and in non-Anglo-American countries, comprise as the most common form 
of corporate ownership through business groups (Colpan et al., 2010). The authors note that 
Italian wine companies are primarily owned by family firms, ahead of cooperatives and nonfamily 
owned companies. In vino veritas, the wine industry has been a font of management and 
governance research interest. This work complements research conducted by Bresciani et al. 
(2016) into the role of families in the French and Italian wine industry, Kidman and Fish (2007) 
into HR practices of Australian wine companies and Galbreath’s (2011) assessment of the impact 
of climate change for wine industry participants.  
  
For Marsigalia et al., this research takes us to the financial performance and sustainability of 
family-owned wine companies. They find that:  
  
“Family firms have both greater longevity and higher financial returns. The cooperatives have very 
good financial performance and a lower company history”.  
  
Family businesses, especially those that have not undergone professionalization, retain their 
uniqueness in that the dynamic of family-owners remain influential in the present and future 
direction and strategy of the company. Sometimes, it is difficult – especially to outsiders – to 
differentiate where the family starts, and when the business begins. More often than not, they 
overlap making it a challenging terrain to negotiate for outsiders. These key ideas about family 
firms have been considered too by Sikandar and Mahmood (2018), Ulrich (2018), Colarossi, 
Giorgino, Steri and Viviani (2008).   
  
One of the findings the authors saw was “a positive correlation between the number of successors 
managing the firm and the type of successors, thus a dynasty or a cousin’s direction corresponds to 
a larger amount of successors actually managing the firm. The amount of family members is 
correlated to the average age of the board, thus more family directors tend to have a higher 
average age.” (Marsigalia et al., 2019, p. 13)  
  
By this time, the business has emerged to become a multi-generational business reaching the 
third generation or the cousin stage (Gersick et al., 1997). This maturity signals the future 
sustainability of the wine company and the increasing importance of outside professionals. The 
conundrum in a multi-generational family business has always been the limited gene pool of 
future managers. There may be more owners than ever, but owners that are also managers must 
professionalize and depersonalize lest family issues interfere into the business issues.   
  
The authors make the finding that non-family member managers not only provide the needed 
professionalism but also play the mediator role in family conflicts:  
  
“To maximize returns the top wine firms also provide a non-family CEO, but a majority of the 
board members belong to the founder's family. A CEO external to the family allows to act as a 
mediator and reducing possible conflicts, above all in proximity of the generational transitions 
(Barbera & Hasso, 2013; Salvato & Corbetta, 2013).”  
  
This brings us back to the governance maxim of who owns, controls. But by ceding some 
management control to the outside non-family manager, the longevity of the firm is assured.   
  
The second article in this issue, by Hlupeko Dube and Zvitambo Kudakwashe discusses the impact 
of corporate governance codes in micro-finance institutions from Zimbabwe, a country recently 
recovering from an authoritarian regime.   
  
One of the earliest corporate governance reports was the UK’s Cadbury Report (1992) which 
promulgated the responsibilities of boards and was widely influential in Anglo-American 
countries. Globalization, and with it, increased international investment appetite from 
Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review/ Volume 3, Issue 1, 2019 
 
5 
predominantly Anglo-American institutional investors saw higher and volatile capital market 
flows (Davis & Marquis, 2005). The collapse of Enron and WorldCom, and the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 saw the wider dispersion of corporate governance codes backed by the 
International Financial Corporation for greater corporate and board responsibility and 
shareholder protection. Around 133 laws, regulations and codes have now been adopted1.   
  
But similar to any Western concept or product transplanted in a non-Western country, issues of 
integration, adaptability and relevance remain. The authors have noted the influence of 
Zimbabwe’s biggest neighbour, South Africa and its King Report IV (2016) on corporate 
governance conception in the country. The authors also look at the three theories underpinning 
the current framework around corporate governance codes: agency, stakeholder and stewardship. 
While the literature review in this article is a useful summary, the authors note that microfinance 
institutions may require their own code.  
  
The third article, by J. Vaz Ferreira, looks at corporate governance in a Portuguese cooperative 
bank. Cooperatives provide a “third-way” of organizing – not family-owned, not corporate-owned 
but owned by a wider pool of stakeholders. Indeed, the Latin phrase quot homines tot sententiae, 
comes to mind when governing a cooperative. Vaz Fereira notes this negotiated angle or 
contested cooperation amongst many stakeholders:  
  
“Cooperativism emerges as a different way of dealing with the same problem of relationship with 
society and other interest groups”. The “importance of cooperation is steadily increasing”. 
Everyday, there are new developments in cooperation between individuals and companies (Greve, 
2002, p. 7). Cooperation emerges as a way for the company to interact with other stakeholders 
and to improve its competitiveness, as it ensures the link between at least two entities through 
value-added activities, sharing strategic objectives without necessarily linking them of capital 
(Greve, 2002).  
  
Corporate governance in banks has been researched by many scholars before (Kostyuk, Pizzo & 
Mizuno, 2012; Ungureanu, 2008; Barako & Tower, 2007). At the same time corporate governance 
in cooperative banks is still a field of research which needs further attention from scholars.  
  
Similar to the first article, the cooperative structure has a long-term outlook but more 
importantly, capital is diffused in this structure. This article provides an insight into stakeholder 
governance in a familiar form. We look forward to more research into the cooperative governance 
research area.  
  
The fourth article in this issue, by Nidhi Sharma Sahore and Anshul Verma, analyses the annual 
reports of Indian companies to assess their disclosure practices and board independence through 
the presence of independent directors. Indian companies are largely owned by families outside of 
state-owned enterprises, and the inclusion of independent directors on insider boards are, 
arguably, the most notable Western corporate governance mechanism introduced in the country.  
  
Their findings note the influence of the US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 on the introduction of 
independent directors on Indian boards and the impact this has on a company’s disclosure 
practices:  
  
“board independence as a governance proxy became more of a mandate or compliance and hence 
gradually lost its importance in impacting voluntary corporate disclosures…voluntary financial 
disclosures are likely to be more if there are proportionately more independent directors in the 
boards”.  
Previous studies have tried to fix the link between the board of directors and financial disclosure. 
As a whole, these studies considered links between various practices of the board of directors 
and financial disclosure and company performance (Muttakin & Ullah, 2012; Kostyuk, 2003; 
Davidson & Rowe, 2004).  
  
The last paper in this issue of the journal is empirical and is devoted to the issue of 
organizational justice. The author of the paper, Viwe Mrwebi reported empirical results which 
demonstrated that four independent variables of the study namely trustworthiness of 
management, extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards, organizational transparency and organizational 
climate influenced perceptions of organisational justice in the South African financial services 
industry which ultimately have an impact on organizational citizenship behaviour and reputable 
employee retention. These issues have been integrated with corporate governance on the board 
                                                          
1
 https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+CG   
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level and explored before by Akanmidu (2017), Ledimo, (2014), Collin (2008), Guerra, Fischmann 
and Machado Filho (2008).  
  
The five articles in this issue share the commonality that they are showing the structural 
adjustments being made in each country to adapt Anglo-American corporate governance 
concepts in largely non-Anglo-American environments (with the exception of the last article on 
South Africa). Corporate governance is here to stay though the local perspectives on them are 
yielding varying results. Good governance is an important function in a modern, functional 
society. Corporations, companies and organizations have a role to play in ensuring their 
governance practices not only meets community standards, but exceeds them.  
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